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Abstract 
This paper examines how marital and fertility patterns have changed along racial and educational 
lines for men and women.  Historically, women with more education have been the least likely to marry 
and have children, but this marriage gap has eroded as the returns to marriage have changed.  Marriage 
and remarriage rates have risen for women with a college degree relative to women with fewer years of 
education.  However, the patterns of, and reasons for, marriage have changed.  College educated women 
marry later, have fewer children, are less likely to view marriage as “financial security”, are happier in 
their marriages and with their family life, and are not only the least likely to divorce, but have had the 
biggest decrease in divorce since the 1970s compared to women without a college degree.  In contrast, 
there have been fewer changes in marital patterns by education for men.   
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I. Introduction 
The family is a constantly changing institution.  In the last half century, marriage and 
fertility rates have fallen, divorce rates have risen (and subsequently fallen), and the character of 
marriage has changed.  These developments have occurred in the wake of widespread social, 
legal, and technological changes that have impacted the incentives for individuals to form and 
invest in marriages and children.  These changes have not impacted all families equally, and in 
this article, we investigate how family behavior has changed for men and women of different 
educational backgrounds.  
To understand how these changes have impacted the incentives for people to form 
families, it is useful to start by understanding the gains from forming a family.  Gary Becker’s 
1981 Treatise on the Family proposed an economic theory of families based on “production 
complementarities,” in which husband and wife specialize in the market and domestic spheres, 
respectively, and hence, are more productive together than apart.  Becker emphasized that 
families are production units that produce both goods in the house (like clean laundry and well-
cared for children) and in the marketplace.  By having one person specialize in domestic 
responsibilities (most often a wife as homemaker), while the other supports the spouse and 
children financially (typically a husband as breadwinner), couples are more efficient than singles.   
This view of the family as a source of production efficiencies has become less relevant 
over time.  The twentieth century brought the development of labor and skill saving 
technological progress in the home.2  This technological change simplified clothes washing and 
drying, cooking (through the development of pre-processed foods and microwaves), 
dishwashing, and housecleaning.  Technological progress also encouraged the shift from home 
production to purchasing items in the market through the development of cheaper mass-produced 
items like ready-made clothes.  These changes have impacted home production through three 
channels: by making home production more efficient; by reducing the returns to specialized 
domestic skills as these technologies substitute capital for skilled labor; and by making market-
produced goods a closer substitute for home-produced goods, which in turn makes market work 
a closer substitute for domestic work.  While some of the effect of these changes was likely an 
increase in the amount and/or quality of home produced goods and services (such as investing 
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more in the care of children), overall time spent in home production fell.  Moreover, there was a 
shift in home production away from specialists toward non-specialists.  Between 1965 and 2003, 
home production by women fell by 12 hours a week on average, while home production by men 
rose by 4.5 hours (Aguiar and Hurst 2007).  In the wake of these changes, the production 
efficiencies realized by families have been eroded.   
During this period the costs of having such a specialist also rose.  Women’s increased 
control over fertility (allowing them to better time and plan pregnancies), their improved access 
to education, and a decline in labor market discrimination all led to higher market wages for 
women (Goldin and Katz 2002; Blau and Kahn 1997, 2000).  These higher wages represent a 
greater opportunity cost for a couple contemplating a stay-at-home spouse.  Further, changes in 
divorce law have made specialization in the home riskier (Stevenson 2007).   
The declining value of production efficiencies from marriage decreases the value of 
marriage and, if this is the only relevant margin along which the value of family life is changing, 
it should lead to a decline in marriage rates overall.  Indeed, Greenwood and Guner (2008) 
develop a model in which technological change in household production is used to explain the 
fall in marriage rates since World War II.  However, the recent technological changes should not 
impact all women equally.  The Beckerian model of the family suggests that those best 
positioned to benefit from household specialization will gain the most from marriage and, 
therefore, be the most likely to marry.  When many of the benefits of marriage arise from the 
greater efficiency achieved through household specialization women who are uninterested in, or 
not well-suited for, specializing in home production will have fewer gains from marriage.  Thus, 
these women will be less likely to find it in their interest to marry.  This prediction is consistent 
with an empirical fact: college-educated women have historically been the least likely group of 
women to marry.  The declining value of household specialization affects these women less, as 
they were less likely to enjoy the benefits in the past.   
While the past several decades have witnessed a decline in marriage rates, it has been 
small relative to the large decline in specialized homemakers.  In 1970, among women with 
children under the age of 5, the majority, 70%, were out of the labor force, presumably full-time 
homemakers.  In the ensuing decades, labor market participation became the norm for mothers 
with young children and only 36% were out of the labor force in 2007.  In contrast, the decline in 
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marriage was less dramatic: in 1970 94% of women had married by age 40, declining to 84% by 
2007.3  
One explanation for why marriage rates have not fallen further is that other dimensions of 
family life have become relatively more important and have also changed in absolute terms.  
Families have experienced an increase in leisure and consumption that has likely increased the 
benefits of shared public goods (Aguiar and Hurst 2007).  Housing and health insurance costs, 
both important family public goods, have increased (Newhouse 1992; Glaeser, Gyourko and 
Saks 2005).  Moreover, there may be consumption and leisure complementarities that become 
more valuable as the time and money available to pursue consumption and leisure has risen.  
These changes in family life offer increased benefits from marriage, partly offsetting some of the 
decrease in the returns to specialization.  Such changes in the returns to married life—from 
production efficiencies to consumption complementarities—should impact not only the 
probability that matches form, but the type of matches that form.   
A shift from production-based marriage to consumption-based marriage should make 
marriage more appealing to those with more disposable income relative to those with less.  Since 
personal and household income within a marriage is a bargained outcome reflecting the skills of 
each spouse and the preferences for home production and leisure, one would prefer to measure 
potential earnings, rather than actual earnings (Pollak 2005).  A reasonable proxy for potential 
earnings is education and, as such, one would similarly predict that marriage should become 
more appealing to those with more education relative to those with less education among both 
men and women.  In addition, there is an important gender shift occurring.  While woman with 
more education are less likely to find the old specialization model of marriage useful, a modern 
marriage based on consumption complementarities is likely more enticing for educated women 
as the new model of marriage thrives when households have the time and resources to enjoy their 
lives.  In contrast, less educated women have less to gain through household specialization in 
marriage today than in the past.       
In addition to differences in the probability of ever marrying, there are differences by 
education in the optimal timing of first marriage.  As Becker (1981) argued, those who plan to be 
specialist homemakers have an incentive to enter marriage early to begin to invest in their skills 
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 Sharper decreases in marriage rates are seen when one looks at younger women due to the rising age of first 
marriage.  In 1970, 84% of 25 year olds had married compared to 42% of 25 year olds in 2007.   
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as a homemaker and reap the returns to specialization.  Among women who do not plan to be 
household specialists, this incentive is not present.  Indeed, it is likely that these women face an 
opposite incentive, to invest in their career before finding a spouse and children.  
The hypothesis that the benefits of marriage is shifting from production efficiencies to 
consumption complementarities has a number of testable implications.  The first implication is 
that marriage should become more common among those with more disposable income and/or 
more leisure time, relative to those with less.  The second is that in a consumption-based model 
of marriage people will be more likely to marry someone with similar preferences, which will 
likely manifest itself as an increase in positive assortative mating along dimensions such as age, 
educational background, occupation, as well as consumption, and leisure preferences.  The third 
is that, among couples without kids, their hours of work should become increasingly similar as 
the value of an hour of leisure is greater when it is coordinated with one’s spouse.  Childcare 
makes this coordination more complicated for those with children.  Finally, similar (albeit 
oppositely signed) patterns should be seen for divorce, with divorce being less common among 
those who work similar hours, have more shared interests, and more disposable income (with 
which to enjoy consumption complementarities).  
This paper focuses on the two of these implications by carefully documenting the 
changes over recent decades in family formation, dissolution, and expansion by education. 4  We 
show that while college-educated women used to be the least likely to marry, today they are 
about as likely as those without a college degree to marry.  There are large racial differences in 
this trend: college-educated white women remain less likely to marry than those with less 
education, while college-educated non-white women are the most likely to marry among non-
whites.  This difference is due to the larger shift away from marriage among blacks, particularly 
among those with less education.  College-educated whites and blacks have also become less 
likely to marry in recent decades; however, the downward shift has been less than that 
experienced by women with less education.  Women of all educational backgrounds have 
delayed marriage, although the delay has been longer among the more highly educated.   
                                                     
4With regards to the second implication, see Schwartz and Mare (2005), who find an increase in educational 
assortative mating since 1960.  See also Sweeney and Cancian (2004) documenting an increase in earnings 
homogamy. 
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Turning to the divorce rate, we show that it initially rose for all groups but has, in recent 
decades, dropped off more sharply among college graduates.  Remarriage rates have fallen for 
everyone, and while the drop has been larger for those with less education, college educated 
white women are still less likely to remarry than those with less education.  Lastly, while trends 
in the average number of children ever born have been similar across groups, the delay in 
fertility is concentrated almost exclusively among women who have attended college.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section II examines trends from the 1950s 
through to 2007 in the timing and propensity to enter marriage by education.  The patterns of 
marriage and the differences by education differ significantly by race, and thus, we will examine 
white and black women separately and will compare the patterns for both to the experiences of 
men.  Section III turns to marital stability, examining divorce and remarriage rates for women 
and men, separately by race and education, while Section IV focuses on changes in fertility.  
Section V explores subjective well-being data and finds that there are important differences in 
marital and family happiness by education.  Section VI concludes with a discussion of the 
interpretation of the results, noting that many of the changes over time in family behavior by 
women’s educational attainment may simply reflect the shift of many women into higher 
educational categories.    
II. Marriage Patterns 
In Figure 1 we examine the proportion of women who have ever married, by age, among 
those with and without a college degree.  Examining the most recent large-scale data—the 2007 
American Community Survey—we see in the first panel of Figure 1 that among white women, 
those with a college-degree are less likely to have ever married and that this holds at every age.  
A very different pattern is seen for black women in the second panel, for whom marriage rates 
are highest for those with the most education after the early 20s.  While previous research 
(Goldstein and Kenney 2001) had forecasted a demographic shift in marriage with college-
educated women more likely to marry today than non-college graduates, the gap has not closed 
6 
 
as fast as predicted and the higher rates of marriage for college-educated women born in 1950-
1965 that they forecasted had not occurred by the time these women were 40 years old.5   
At the turn of the last century, women attended college at rates similar to that of men, yet 
few of these women ever married (Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006). Thirty percent of college-
educated women born in the last 20 years of the 19th century remained unmarried at age 50, a 
rate four times that of women without a college degree (Goldin, 2004). While the marriage gap 
has clearly closed, the data in Figure 1 point to the fact that for no generation of women have we 
witnessed a cross-over in which college-educated white women are marrying at higher rates 
compared to white women with less education.  Among 46-to-60-year-old white women there is 
a fairly stable gap in which college-educated women are around 3 percentage points less likely to 
have married compared to women with less education. The stability of this gap among older 
women illustrates that the lower likelihood of college-educated women ever-marrying persisted 
for some time, even as the number of women completing college was rising.   
Among older women, the differences in ever-married rates are indicative of changing 
behavior across cohorts.  Ever-married rates were falling slightly for all women in the birth 
cohorts from 1937 to 1961, while education was increasing rapidly.6  Differences in the gap in 
marriage rates by education at younger ages reflect both changing behavior across cohorts and 
differences in the life-cycle pattern of marriage by educational attainment. 
 Examining life-cycle patterns of marriage by cohort reveals that the “marriage gap” 
between college-educated women and their less-educated counterparts has been shrinking for 
many generations.  Figure 2 uses the decennial censuses of population from 1950 through to 
2000 to show the evolution over time in both the marriage gap and the timing of first marriage by 
education for white women.  For each decade, the percent of white women who have ever-
married is shown at each age for those with a high school degree or less and separately for those 
who attended some college, but did not receive a four-year college degree, and college graduates.  
In each decade white female college graduates are clearly less likely to ever marry compared to 
women with no or some college.  The graphs show that between 1950 and 2000 marital behavior 
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 Martin (2004a)(2004), using more recent data also finds that the shift is taking longer than earlier forecasts had 
suggested but predicts that the crossover may occur for women born after 1965.  
6
 Goldin (2006) notes that the increase in women’s college attendance and completion relative to men began with 
the birth cohorts of the late 1940s and that this is also the cohort for whom an inflection point in the growth in 
female enrollment in graduate programs is seen.  
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has changed for all groups both in terms of the timing of marriage in the life cycle and in the 
probability of ever marrying.   
Women with a college degree increasingly delayed marriage to older ages both earlier, 
and to a greater extent, than women with either a high school degree or some college.  The age at 
first marriage of female college graduates began to rise with those graduating in the late 1960s 
(Goldin, 2004).  In 1970, 74% of 25 year old college graduates had ever-married; this compares 
to 53%, 43%, and 36% in 1980, 1990, and 2007 respectively.  In contrast, the percent of 25 year 
old high school graduates who had ever-married was 90%, 83%, 73%, and 52% in 1970, 1980, 
1990, and 2007 respectively.  Indeed, in the last 17 years there has been a larger decrease in 
marriage among women in their early 20s with no college compared with previous decades, 
while the largest shift away from early marriage among college-educated women occurred 
between 1970 and 1980.7  The pattern among women with some college has been similar to that 
of those with no college, although the shift toward later marriage happened a decade earlier for 
these women.   
Overall, the increased delay in marriage is consistent with the changing incentives 
affecting individuals.  Goldin and Katz (2002) demonstrate that the availability of the birth 
control pill enabled later marriages and greater labor force participation among college-educated 
women.  The technological advance of the birth control pill was complemented by other 
technological changes that lowered the relative cost of maintaining a household as a single 
(Greenwood and Guner 2008) and reduced the value of specialization in the home.  More recent 
increases in marital postponement among college-educated women likely reflect increasing 
returns to education and experience, both of which increase the incentives to postpone potential 
career disruptions.  Finally, a shift toward spousal matching on consumption and leisure 
preferences may lead to greater heterogeneity in matching and thus an increased benefit of time 
spent searching.   
The large gaps in marriage rates by education seen among women in their 20s dissipate 
by their 30s.  To get a better understanding of marital outcomes it is useful to look at ever-
married rates for women at older ages; as such, we turn to the end data points in Figure 2, when 
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the women are age 50.  For white women born in 1900, 76% of those who were college-educated 
women had ever-married by age 50.8  In contrast, 90% of high school graduates in this cohort 
had married by age 50.9  Marriage rates for college-educated women grew rapidly for women 
born between 1900 and 1930 and by the 1980 Census, 91% of college-educated 50-year old 
women had married.  During this period, marriage rates were also growing for women in this 
cohort with less education and ever-married rates hit 97% for those with a high school degree or 
less.  Thus, between the 1950 and 1980 Censuses, the closing of the educational marriage gap for 
white women was driven by large increases in the marriage rates of college-educated women, 
much of which occurred at older ages.10 
Since 1980, there has been little change in the likelihood that college graduates ultimately 
marry.  Between 1980 and 2007 the percent ever-married fell by 4 and 2 percentage points 
among 40 and 50 year old college graduates, respectively.  The fall in marriage among high 
school graduates was somewhat greater, with ever-married rates falling by 8 and 4 percentage 
points among 40 and 50 year olds, respectively.  The ever-married rates of those with some 
college are similar to high school graduates.  In sum, those with less education had larger relative 
declines in marriage between 1980 and 2007 and it is this relatively larger decline in marriage 
rates among those with less education that led to further decreases in the educational marriage 
gap since 1980. 
Two facts seen in Figure 2 are worth noting: among white women, while marriage rates 
have fallen overall in recent decades, they are still similar to that seen in the 1950s.  Indeed, 
among those with a high school degree, by age 40, a greater percentage had entered into 
marriage in 2007 than had done so in 1950.  A similar increase was also seen among women 
with some college and, as has already been noted, a large increase in marriage rates has occurred 
among women with a college degree.  Marriage rates immediately following World War II were 
at a historic high, leading to historically high ever-married rates for women who were of 
marrying age during this period, and thus, high ever-married rates in the 1960 and 1970 
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 This comes from the 1950 census.  By examining women at age 50 in each of the Censuses from 1950 to 2000, we 
are presenting ever-married rates (by age 50) for the 1900-1950 birth cohorts. 
9
 As previously noted, women born two decades before were even less likely to marry and the gap between college-
educated women and those without a college degree shrunk in the decades before the turn of the 20th century (Goldin 
1997). 
10
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Censuses (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  The second fact is that between 1950 and 1980 the 
percent ever-married plateaued, and did so at a relatively early age.  In contrast, between 1990 
and 2007 ever-married rates continue to increase among women over the age of 40.  While some 
of the upward age slope at older ages seen in Figure 2 reflects the decline in marriage among 
more recent cohorts, marriage rates among older adults have risen in recent decades.  For 
example, 93% of 40 year old white women had married in 1990 and this had risen to 94% by age 
50 in 2000 for this cohort.  Thus, in the decade after age 40, 15% of those who had never married 
did so.   
As previously discussed, the age of first marriage has risen for all white women, but 
markedly more for those with a college degree.  In 2000, by age 22, 50% of white women with 
less than a high school degree had married. In comparison, the 50% threshold was crossed at age 
23, 24, and 27 for those with a high school degree, some college, and a college-degree, 
respectively.  While some education may occur later, an examination of marital history data 
suggests that these patterns hold even when education is measured at a later point in life.11   
While white women with a college education are increasingly postponing marriage, as 
previously noted, they have also increased their likelihood of ever marrying.  In contrast, women 
with less education are postponing marriage, albeit to a lesser extent, and, in recent decades, they 
have also become somewhat less likely to ever marry.  What is less known is how much of this 
shift reflects the changes in the composition of women in each of the educational categories, a 
change in how educational attainment may impact the desire or value of marriage for these 
women, or a change in how educational attainment affects the attractiveness of women to men in 
the marriage market.  We will return to these issues in section VI. 
A different picture emerges when we examine marital trends among black women by 
education. Figure 3 shows, by education, the percent of black women who have married by each 
age across the decades.12  The most striking fact is the large declines in marriage rates among 
black women of all educational backgrounds.  While the ever-married rates of 40 year old white 
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 Since most people who will complete college have done so by their late 20s, we examine 28-30 year old women 
in the 2004 SIPP, an age group that allows the most comparability with those in the 2000 Census.  For these women, 
the age at which 50% had entered a first marriage was 23, 23, 24, and 26 for women with less than high school, high 
school, some college, and college, respectively.   
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 The panel begins in 1960 for blacks because there are too few African-Americans with education beyond high 
school in 1950 to generate meaningful estimates.  In the 1950 Census only 2% of 18 to 50 year old black women had 
any education beyond high school; by 1960, the proportion had tripled to 6%.   
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female college graduates fell only 4 percentage points between 1980 and 2007, the fall among 
black female college graduates was 19 percentage points.  Among high school graduates the 
ever-married rates of black women fell by 25 percentage points, compared to a fall of 8 
percentage points among whites.  Moreover, black women, who have not married by age 40, 
have a smaller probability of marrying in the ensuing decade compared to white women in their 
cohort.  In 1990, 82% of black women had married by age 40.  Ten years later, we see that 83% 
of 50 year old black women have married—a closure of the never-married rate of about 10%. 
In the 1960s through to the 1980s, black women with any college married later than those 
with no college.  However, after accounting for differences in the age of first marriage, black 
female college graduates have historically been as likely to marry as black women with less 
education.  By 1990, black women with any college education had become more likely to ever 
marry compared with those with no college and this trend has continued.  As with white women, 
the decrease in marriage rates was lower among college-educated black women.  These shifts 
have led to a positive gap in which college-educated black women are more likely to marry 
compared to black women with less education.   
Turning to men, we see smaller differences in marital formation behavior by educational 
backgrounds than is seen for women.  Figures 4 and 5 show ever-married rates by age and 
education for white and black men, respectively, from 1960 through to 2007.  As with women, 
men with more education tend to marry at later ages and the age of first marriage has been rising 
for all men.  Among white men, there have historically been few differences in the eventual 
likelihood of marrying by educational attainment.  However, between 1990 and 2007, male 
college graduates became slightly more likely than those with less education to ever marry and, 
as with women, this change has arisen because of overall declines in marriage that have been 
sharpest for those with the least education.   
A similar pattern is seen among black men, although the timing differs by several 
decades and, as with black women, there have been much steeper declines in marriage among 
blacks regardless of education.  Starting in 1980, black male college graduates became more 
likely than black high school graduates to ever marry.  This gap widened in the ensuing decades, 
a pattern that, as with whites, largely reflects larger declines in marriage among those with less 
education.  In 2007, college-educated black men in their forties were 5 percentage points less 
likely to have ever-married compared with college-educated white men, yet they were more 
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likely to have married compared to black men with less education or compared to black women 
of any educational background.  Thus, college-educated men remain the most likely to marry 
among blacks.   
In summary, for both men and women, marriage rates have declined since the 1980s 
among people of all educational backgrounds.  However, these declines have been steeper 
among those with less education.  Because college-educated white women had historically been 
less likely to marry, these shifts in marital behavior have led to a closing of the education gap in 
marriage for white women and there has been little difference by education in the likelihood of a 
woman marrying during her lifetime for recent generations.  Among white men, a small gap has 
emerged in recent years in which those who attend college are more likely to marry than are 
those who do not. 
Among blacks, the decline in the proportion marrying began in the 1950s.  Between 1950 
and 1980, the proportion of blacks who had married by the end of their 30s fell for all education 
groups, while the marriage rate rose for all whites.  These different trends reversed the racial 
trends in marriage, opening a new gap in which whites were more likely to marry than were 
blacks.  In the ensuing period the declines in marriage have been most stark among blacks and a 
wide gap has opened in marriage rates by race.  Additionally, there are now large differences in 
marriage by education among both black men and women in which those with more education 
have become more likely to marry.   
III. Marital Stability 
Divorce rates rose for much of the 20th century, reaching a peak in 1979 and falling 
thereafter (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  One explanation for the high divorce rates of the 
1970s may be that this period reflected a transition, with many having married the right partner 
for the old specialization model of marriage, only to find that pairing inadequate for the modern 
consumption-based marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008b).  As such, it is perhaps not 
surprising that current divorce rates are similar to those witnessed at the end of the 1960s.  This 
fall in divorce rates is seen whether divorces are measured relative to the population or the stock 
of married people.  Moreover, examining individual marriages, those who have married in recent 
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years have been more likely to stay together than their parents’ generation (Stevenson and 
Wolfers 2008a). 
These patterns have not, however, occurred equally among those with more and less 
education.  We examine the trends in divorce using the marital histories collected in the 2004 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  In general, divorce rates are lowest among 
those with a college-degree, are the highest for those with some college, while those with a high 
school degree or below have divorce rates that fall in-between the two groups.13  The fact that it 
is those with “some college” that are the most at risk of divorce illustrates the potential role of 
selection in explaining why marital and divorce outcomes differ by educational attainment.  
Those with “some college” have either attended a 2 year program or have failed to complete a 4-
year program.14  As such, those with some college disproportionately represent those without the 
stamina or resources to complete their education.  It is perhaps not surprising that this group 
would have similar difficulties maintaining their marriage.15   
The inverted u-pattern of divorce rates by educational attainment is seen for both men 
and women and for both blacks and whites, across most decades.  However, the magnitude of the 
differences in divorce by education has changed over time.  Divorce rates rose during the 1960s 
and 1970s and couples who married during this time period experienced more marital 
dissolutions when compared to the men and women who married in the 1950s.  The rise in 
divorce culminated in smaller differences by education in divorce rates 25 years post-marriage 
for those marrying in the 1970s.  Among white men and women with a high school degree or 
less, 43% and 42%, respectively, of their marriages had ended within 25 years.  For those with a 
college degree, 41% of women and 37% of men had divorced, and for those with some college, 
the percent divorcing hit the 50% mark for women and was just below—48%—for men.   
These patterns can be seen in Figures 6 and 7 which show the proportion of women’s and 
men’s first marriages, respectively, ending in divorce by cohort, educational attainment, and 
race.16  The top row of each figure shows the divorce hazard for blacks, while the bottom row 
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 Several recent papers using different data sets have examined marital dissolution by education and also find a 
trend in lower divorce rates among college graduates. (Raley and Bumpass 2003, Sweeney and Phillips 2004, and 
Martin 2006).   
14
 Among adults in the 2000 census, around 78% of those with some college had received no degree. 
15
 For a similar argument, see Glick (1957)   
16
 Divorce is measured using retrospective marital histories from the 2004 SIPP in which individuals report the year 
of their first marriage and, if that marriage has ended by divorce, the year that the divorce occurred.  In addition, 
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shows the divorce hazard for whites.17  In addition, Table 1 reports the percent of women and 
men who have divorced following 10 and 20 years of marriage. 
The divorce experience subsequent to the overall rise in divorce among those marrying in 
the 1970s has differed by education.  For college graduates, the cohort marrying in the 1970s was 
the most likely to divorce.  Subsequent cohorts of college graduates have had greater stability in 
their marriages.  Marriages of college-graduates that began in the 1980s have been less likely to 
end in divorce than those that began in the 1970s and those that began in the 1990s were even 
less likely to do so.   
Table 1 illustrates these trends by showing the percent divorcing within 10 and 20 years 
of marriage.  Among those marrying in the 1950s, only 12% of the marriages of white female 
college-graduates and 17% of those of white male college-graduates ended by divorce within the 
first 20 years of marriage.  For those marrying in the 1960s, the dissolution rates had roughly 
doubled.  They rose even further for those marrying in the 1970s, with 37% and 34% of the 
marriages of female and male college graduates ending within 20 years.  The trend reversed after 
the 1970s cohort, and, among those marrying in the 1980s, the divorce rates of this marriage 
cohort had fallen back to rates similar to those experienced by the 1960s marriage cohort.  For 
more recent cohorts, it is only possible to assess their marital dissolution rates earlier in 
marriage, but, in the first decade of marriage, divorce rates for those marrying in the 1990s were 
lower than those experienced by the previous cohort. 
The experience of black college-graduates is similar; however, the estimated divorce 
hazards for black college-graduates are higher.  Indeed, among all educational groups the 
estimated divorce rates are often higher among blacks.  Yet, it is important to note that the much 
smaller sample size yields imprecise estimates.  In nearly all cases the divorce rates of blacks are 
not statistically significantly different from those of whites.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
individuals report the year of death if their marriage ended via their spouse’s death (deaths that occur after a divorce 
are not reported).  Marriages that end through the death of a spouse, and for which no divorce occurred, are included 
in the denominator.  Excluding these marriages from the analysis has little effect on divorce rates in the first 20 
years of marriage and raises divorce rates at 25 years post-marriage by a few percentage points.  The reason for 
including these marriages is that excluding them mechanically raises the divorce rate as people age, since all 
marriages must end either through death or divorce.    
17
 We concentrate on first marriages so that the divorce hazards reflect the average person’s experience rather than 
the average marital experience.  The patterns are similar for second marriage, although second marriages are more 
likely to end in divorce.   
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Turning to those without a college degree we see that the high divorce rates experienced 
by those marrying in the 1970s continued for those marrying in the 1980s.  Examining those 
marrying in the 1990s, it appears as if the divorce rates for those with less than a college degree 
have begun to fall with this most recent marriage cohort, particularly among those with a high 
school degree or less.  Those with no college who married in the 1990s were about as likely to 
have made it to their 10th anniversary as were those who married in the 1960s.  In contrast, 
among those with only some college, a statistically significant fall in divorce rates by the 10th 
anniversary occurred only among African-American males. 
While forecasting divorce rates is tricky, the data point to divorce happening earlier in 
marriage among more recent cohorts. Across all education groups, the divorce rate in the first 5 
years has been little changed since the 1970s, even when the divorce rate at 10 or 20 years has 
fallen.  This pattern suggests that divorces that do happen are increasingly happening earlier in 
the marriage.  This shift toward divorce earlier in marriage has been even more pronounced 
among those with a high school degree or less.  Thus, differences in marital survival by 
education in recent decades are more extreme when looking at only the first decade of a 
marriage.  Therefore, the early signs of further falls in divorce for those marrying in the 1990s 
are suggestive of greater declines in divorce rates in the coming decade for this group.     
In sum, both men and women with a college degree have been consistently less likely to 
divorce and have also experienced a larger decline in divorce probabilities in the last few 
decades.   
IV. Remarriage 
The high divorce rates of the 1970s and the increasing age of first marriage both 
contribute to thicker remarriage markets.  As such, one might suspect that remarriage rates would 
have risen over time.  What we see instead is that remarriage rates have fallen over time for all 
groups of women.  Figure 8 and 9 show remarriage hazards among divorced white and black 
women, respectively.18  The percent who have remarried is shown for each year post-divorce for 
women by their educational attainment.       
                                                     
18
 Remarriage rates are calculated from marital histories collected in 1971, 1980, and 1995 from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and in 2004 from the SIPP. 
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In 1971, the majority of divorced women had remarried within 5 years following a 
divorce.  Among whites, college-educated women were the least likely to remarry with only two-
thirds remarried 10 years post-divorce, compared with three-quarters of those with a high school 
degree or less.  In contrast, there was little difference in remarriage rates among black women of 
differing educational backgrounds, with around 70% of all black women having remarried within 
10 years of a divorce.  The 1980 sample shows a retreat from remarriage that is most pronounced 
among black women with a high school degree or less and among white women with a college 
degree.  Ten years post-marriage, only 55% and 58% of these two groups had remarried.  The 
percent of white women with a high school degree or less who had remarried after 10 years was 
only 2 percentage points lower than that seen in the 1971 sample, while the percent of college-
educated white women had fallen 7 percentage points. 
 In 1995, remarriage rates are somewhat higher among whites and are similar to those 
seen in 1971.  Remarriage rates for all educational groups of white women are, however, lower 
in the 2004 sample.  Turning to black women, a different picture emerges.  The fall in remarriage 
among black women has been greater and was most pronounced in the 1980 sample among those 
with a high school degree or below.  As such, in 1980 these less educated black women were the 
least likely to remarry.  The fall in remarriage among black women has continued in the 1995 
and 2004 samples and the differences by education have largely been eroded.  By the 2004 
sample, it is 10 years post-marriage before the majority of black women have remarried. 
Figure 10 shows that a similar decrease in remarriage has occurred among both white and 
black men of all educational groups.  However, remarriage is more common among men than 
among women and, unlike women, remarriage rates rise with education among both black and 
white men.19  In 1971, 85% of white, and 87% of black, college-educated men had remarried 
within 10 years following a divorce.  In 2004, these rates had fallen to 76% and 61% 
respectively.  Remarriage rates for those with a high school degree or below also fell, but to a 
lesser extent, thereby eroding some of the remarriage gap by education.   
                                                     
19
 See also Bumpass, Sweet, and Martin (1990), who note this phenomenon when examining the 1980 and 1985 
CPS. 
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Table 2 shows the decline over time in the likelihood of remarriage in a regression 
context, using alternative data sources.20  The first column shows that remarriage rates have been 
lower in each survey wave we examine.  In the second column we add controls for changes in 
first marriage behavior as measured by cohort and age of first marriage.  These controls suggest 
that remarriage has fallen even more steeply over time.  The next four columns examine the 
trends separately by race and sex.  Since 1980, white men, the group most likely to remarry, have 
experienced sharper declines in remarriage compared to white women.  However, the largest 
declines in remarriage have occurred among blacks.  Both black men and women have become 
substantially less likely to remarry.  
Some of the decline in remarriage may reflect couples cohabiting rather than remarrying. 
Remarriages are more likely than first marriages to be preceded by a period of cohabtation.  In 
the 2000s, 75% of those entering a second or higher order marriage had cohabited prior to the 
marriage, while 59% of those entering a first marriage had done so (Stevenson and Wolfers, 
2007).  Additionally, the thicker matching market may lead to an increased duration of search by 
increasing the option value of continued search and/or by increasing one’s utility while single 
(aside from the potential to meet mates, being single may be more enjoyable when there are lots 
of singles in one’s age bracket). 
While remarriage rates have fallen overall, the pattern of remarriage by education has not 
changed.  Remarriage among white women falls with educational attainment, while there are 
little differences in remarriage by education among black women.  Among men, remarriage rises 
with education.  These patterns are similar to what we see when examining first marriages, with 
the exception that college-educated white women remain much less likely to remarry compared 
to those with less education.  Unlike the education gap in first marriages, the remarriage gap by 
education has not closed in recent years.   
One explanation for this may lie in the changing patterns of first marriage.  Table 2 
shows that a college degree is associated with a lower likelihood of having remarried among 
white women in the 2004 SIPP.  However, adding controls for length of marriage and years since 
the divorce reduces the coefficient on the college indicator variable and adding a control for the 
age at marriage attenuates the coefficient further.  In recent years more highly educated women 
                                                     
20
 The regression analysis uses data from the 1970 and 1980 decennial Censuses and the 1991, 1992, 1993 and 2004 
Panels of the SIPP.  We turn to the SIPP beginning in 1991 as questions used to infer remarriage from the Census 
were discontinued after 1980. 
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have tended to marry later and have longer duration marriages.  It is these differences in the 
patterns of first marriage that explain much of the recent differences in remarriage rates by 
education among white women.  However, this is not the case in earlier periods.  Examining 
remarriage in the 1971, 1980, and 1995 CPS marital history supplements, columns 4-6 show that 
college-educated women in the 1971 and 1980 samples were less likely to remarry even once 
controls are added for timing of their first marriage.  In 1995, however, this difference by 
education was, as in 2004, explained by the patterns of first marriage.  Remarriage has thus 
largely followed the patterns seen in first marriage, with remarriage rates falling over time and a 
closing over time of the education gap among white women. 
V. Fertility  
Fertility declines starkly as maternal education rises and the educational differences have 
not changed despite enormous increases in the educational attainment of women.  Figure 11 
shows the number of children in the household from 1950-2007 for white women by age and 
level of education.  As with marriage, these graphs show both differences in fertility timing and 
changes in fertility across cohorts.  In 1950, college graduates had the fewest number of children 
in the household at every point in the life cycle.  However, in subsequent decades, the number of 
children in the homes of older women became greatest for college graduates—illustrating a shift 
towards later fertility that has continued through to the present time.21  In each successive Census 
there is a steady decrease in the probability that college-educated women have children in the 
home in their 20s and 30s.  Since the 1970s, college graduates in their 30s have become more 
likely than they were in the past, and more likely than other women, to have children (Martin 
2000).  This rise in maternal age is also illustrated by the fact that the median age at which 
mothers with a college degree have an infant in the household has risen by 4 years over this 
period.   
In contrast, there has been little increase in the likelihood that those with less education 
have children later in life and the age distribution of women with children in the home among 
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 Completed fertility by birth cohort was calculated from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses.  In the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses children ever born peaked for 47 and 57 year old women, respectively, or those born in 1933.  Among 
college educated women, the peak occurred a few years earlier with the 1930 birth cohort (women who were ages 50 
and 60 in the 1980 and 1990 Censuses respectively). 
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those with a high school degree or less is little changed.  This is further illustrated by the fact that 
there has been no change in the median age at which mothers without any college-education 
have an infant in the household.  Thus, the well-publicized delay in fertility has been occurring 
almost exclusively among women with more education. 22   
Figure 12 shows a similar pattern among black women.  Ellwood and Jencks (2002) 
highlighted the fact that black women with less education have increasingly delayed marriage, 
yet have not delayed or reduced childbearing to the same extent.  The result is a rise in out-of-
wedlock births which has happened for both black and white women with less education.  As the 
ever-married rates of black women with no college fell by three times as much as the fall among 
white women with no college, the rise in out-of-wedlock childbirths has been greatest among 
black women with less education.  Thus changes in marriage, not fertility, account for the rise in 
out-of-wedlock childbirth.  
Greater access to education and higher potential wages, combined with improved control 
over fertility, has altered the incentives that women face.  Birth control has lowered the cost of 
postponing pregnancy, while better human capital and market options and the rising returns to 
work experience have increased the opportunity cost of career disruptions, particularly in the 
early stages of one’s career.  That the delay has occurred most strongly among women at the top 
of the educational ladder point to the fact that these developments have most sharply affected 
those with more education.  Although only suggestive evidence has been provided that the costs 
to fertility have risen over time (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2007), Miller (2007) shows in a 
cross section of women that delaying fertility increases lifetime earnings, and the gains are 
highest for college graduates.  Further evidence comes from Goldin and Katz (2008), who 
examine the family and work behavior of multiple cohorts from Harvard/Radcliffe.  Patterns for 
women from this selective institution, who tend to be more strongly tied to the labor market, 
indicate a much larger increase in fertility delay relative to other college graduates. 
In addition to changes in the timing of fertility, total fertility has fallen steadily since the 
baby boom for white and black women of all educational backgrounds.  Table 4 shows the 
number of children ever born to 45-50 year old women (a reasonable proxy for completed 
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 Rindfuss, Morgan, Offut (1996), Martin (2004b), and Yang and Morgan (2004) examine the issue through the 
early 1990s and similarly find a larger delay for more educated women. 
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fertility) over the past five decades.23  Despite changes in total fertility across the decades, the 
pattern of falling fertility with education is similar in all time periods for all women, and this is 
seen when examining the National Survey of Family Growth as well (Preston and Sten 2008) 24  
College graduates have the fewest children, followed by those with some college, high school 
graduates, and finally high school dropouts have the greatest number of children.  Fertility for all 
groups of 45-50 year olds rose between the 1950 and 1980 Censuses, and has decreased 
thereafter such that fertility rates in 2004 are similar, albeit slightly higher, to those seen in 1960 
for each education group.  However, total fertility has dropped throughout the period, as 
women’s educational attainment has risen enormously with no subsequent erosion of the 
negative relationship between fertility and education.   
VI. Marital Happiness 
Families have clearly changed their behavior in terms of formation, expansion (through 
children), and dissolution in a way that is correlated with education.  Subjective well-being data 
can perhaps help us better understand more subtle differences in the family experience between 
people with differing educational backgrounds.  Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) asks 
individuals how satisfied they are with their family life and how happy they are with their 
marriage as well as other attitudinal questions such as whether married people are happier than 
unmarried people.  The GSS is a nationally representative sample of about 1,500 respondents 
each year from 1972-1993 (except 1992), and continues with around 3,000 respondents every 
second year from 1994 through to 2004, rising to 4,500 respondents in 2006.  Analyzing these 
data, we quickly see that the perceived benefits of marriage differ by education.  Nearly four 
times as many non-college graduates as college graduates agree that “financial security is the 
main benefit of marriage,” and are slightly more likely to agree that “children are the main 
purpose of marriage.”  Not surprisingly, those with a college degree are less likely to see 
“production complementarities” as the main benefit of marriage.  
Turning to expectations of marital happiness, we see in Table 5 that when people are 
asked generally whether they would agree with the statement that married people are happier 
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 The Census stopped asking about children ever born after the 1990 Census and thus the most recent data come 
from the 2004 SIPP. 
24
 Goldin (2004) shows a similar pattern by education in the percent that never have children. 
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than unmarried people (1988, 1994, and 2002), there is a clear trend with fewer people agreeing 
over time.  Consistent with the changing marital behavior patterns, college-educated women 
have become slightly more likely to believe that married people are happier; while women 
without a college degree have become substantially less likely to agree that married people are 
happier.  Moreover, in 1988, women without a college degree were more likely than college 
graduates to agree that married people are happier and, by 2002, they were much less likely than 
college graduates to agree.  A similar pattern has not occurred among men, rather both those with 
and without college degrees became less likely to agree over time.  Despite this fall, men remain 
more likely than women to believe that married people are happier than unmarried people. 
Turning to actual happiness in their marriage, Tables 6 and 7 show that people with more 
education are happier in their marriages and with their family life, just as they are more likely to 
think that married people are happier than unmarried people.  The college-non-college 
differential is particularly stark for women.  And as with expectations regarding the happiness of 
married people, the marital happiness data reveal that men are typically happier in their 
marriages than are women.   
In Table 6 we run ordered probits by gender on how happy respondents are with their 
marriage.  College-educated white women have been consistently happier in their marriages with 
no apparent time trend in these differences.  However, the coefficient is reduced by forty percent 
when we add controls, a reduction which is being driven by differences in the number of 
children, income, and parents’ education.  College-educated white men are also more likely to be 
happier in their marriage compared with non-college educated white men, and this difference 
increases over time.  On the other hand, college-educated black men and women appear to be no 
happier in their marriages than are those without college degrees.   
Table 7 explores how much satisfaction respondents get from their family life by 
education again using ordered probits.  We find that, as with marital satisfaction, college-
educated white women consistently get more satisfaction from their family life, although the 
relationship is being driven solely by college-educated white women who were married at the 
time of their interview.  Black college educated women do not appear to get any more 
satisfaction than those with no college, and we can reject that the black-white college estimates 
are the same when controls are added.  However, college educated black and white men get more 
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satisfaction at a marginally significant level without covariates although no difference is found 
for men of either group when controls are added.     
VII. Discussion 
This paper has documented changes in the family experience for women and men at the 
bottom and top of the educational distribution by race.  College-educated women born at the 
beginning of the last century were the women least likely to marry.  As we enter the 21st century 
these women are poised to become the most likely to ever marry.  This shift occurred in two 
stages.  In the first stage, college-educated women had rapid increases in the probability of 
marrying.  In the second stage, college-educated women had smaller falls in marriage compared 
to those with less education.  Both of these stages have contributed to a closing of the marriage 
gap by education.  Like women, male college-graduates in the latter period had smaller falls in 
marriage compared to men with less education, opening a small marriage gap in which men with 
the most education have the greatest likelihood of marriage. 
Since 1950 the percent of women earning college degrees has increased tremendously.  
This substantial increase in educational attainment, shown in Table 8, might mean that 
compositional shifts explain the trends in family behavior by women’s education.  That is, it 
might be that the family behavior of the women who would have been in each educational group 
in an earlier period has not changed, but rather that recent cohorts of college graduates have 
expanded to include those with greater preferences for marriage.  To look at the role of 
compositional changes we divided college graduates in 2007 into two groups.  The first 
represents the proportion of women in 1950 who went to college—roughly 6% of women.  This 
group was assigned the marriage rates of women who went to college in 1950.  The second 
group—the remaining quarter of women who were college graduates in 2007—was assigned the 
marriage rates of women who didn’t go to college in 1950.  For 45-to-50 year old women in 
2007, this exercise replicates almost perfectly the actually percent that have ever married.  A 
similar exercise shows that simple compositional shifts cannot, however, explain the trends in 
fertility.   
However, Goldin (2004) notes that many of the trends in marital behavior among college-
educated women can be seen when the group is limited to a particular college.  For example, 
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(Goldin and Katz, 2008) find that men and women attending Harvard in the late 1960s and early 
1970s experienced a divorce rate that was nearly twice that of those graduating two decades 
later.  The divorce patterns seen among the Harvard graduates are similar to those seen when one 
examines college graduates in general. 
The differences in marital behavior that we have documented yield very different marital 
experiences over the lifecycle.  The growing difference in the patterns of marriage entry for 
women of different educational backgrounds and race combined with different patterns in 
divorce and remarriage rates has led to stark differences in the probability of being married at 
specific ages.  In Figure 13, we show the percent of white and black women who are currently 
married by education.  In 1960, college educated women were less likely to be married at every 
age.  Today, those without a college degree are the most likely to be married in their 20s, while 
those with a college degree are more likely to be married in their 30s and 40s.  These differences 
reflect the different patterns of age at marriage and the likelihood of divorce. 
What is missing from our analysis is cohabitation.  Unfortunately cohabitation data is 
relatively sparse and so does not lend itself easily to the long-run analysis that we pursue here.  
Yet, it is likely that such an analysis would reveal that cohabitation cannot explain the entire 
decline in marriage and remarriage.  Adults today are spending more time as singles.  For 
college-graduates those years tend to occur early in the lifecycle with most spending much of 
their 20s outside marriage, while those with less education are more likely to spend some of their 
30s and 40s outside of a marital relationship. 
In 1981 Andrew Cherlin described the new typical life course as “marriage, divorce, 
remarriage.”  Today, marriage is happening later, divorce is less likely, and remarriage is less 
common.  Moreover, the typical life pattern differs by race and education.  Among college 
graduates the typical life pattern now involves a prolonged period of being single before entering 
marriage and having children.  Divorce and remarriage are now experienced by a shrinking 
minority of the college-educated.  Among those with no college, the typical life experience 
remains marriage, children, divorce, remarriage, but is quickly shifting toward children, 
marriage, divorce, and a prolonged period of being single or cohabiting before remarriage.   
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Table 1:  Percent of Marriages Ending in Divorce within 10 & 20 Years of Marriage 
  Divorced by 10 years following 
marriage 
 Divorced by 20 years following 
marriage 
 
 White Black  White Black 
Year: Education: Women 
(1) 
Men 
(2) 
Women 
(3) 
Men 
(4) 
 Women 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
Women 
(7) 
Men 
(8) 
1950 College 4 
(1.2) 
5 
(1.1) 
11 
(4.7) 
8 
(7.6) 
 12 
(1.8) 
17 
(1.8) 
28 
(7.5) 
22 
(11) 
 
Some College 11 
(1.1) 
9 
(1.2) 
13 
(4.0) 
9 
(5.4) 
 23 
(1.6) 
20 
(1.8) 
31 
(5.4) 
26 
(7.4) 
 
High School 
or less 
9 
(.7) 
9 
(.9) 
4 
(1.2) 
6 
(2.4) 
 18 
(1.0) 
19 
(1.3) 
22 
(3.1) 
25 
(4.2) 
1960 College 15 
(1.4) 
13 
(1.2) 
13 
(4.4) 
16 
(6.5) 
 29 
(1.7) 
26 
(1.6) 
32 
(6.4) 
34 
(9.5) 
 
Some College 25 
(1.3) 
20 
(1.3) 
27 
(4.2) 
31 
(5.3) 
 41 
(1.5) 
37 
(1.6) 
48 
(4.6) 
44 
(5.5) 
 
High School 
or less 
18 
(1.0) 
20 
(1.2) 
11 
(2.1) 
14 
(2.9) 
 30 
(1.2) 
34 
(1.5) 
27 
(3.1) 
36 
(4.0) 
1970 College 23 
(1.4) 
18 
(1.2) 
25 
(5.2) 
19 
(5.4) 
 37 
(1.6) 
34 
(1.5) 
44 
(5.9) 
36 
(6.9) 
 
Some College 30 
(1.2) 
29 
(1.3) 
38 
(3.4) 
29 
(4.1) 
 46 
(1.3) 
44 
(1.4) 
54 
(3.5) 
50 
(4.4) 
 
High School 
or less 
26 
(1.1) 
25 
(1.1) 
22 
(2.9) 
26 
(3.5) 
 39 
(1.3) 
39 
(1.4) 
38 
(3.5) 
45 
(3.9) 
1980 College 20 
(1.2) 
15 
(1.1) 
29 
(5.7) 
17 
(4.9) 
 31 
(2.0) 
25 
(1.9) 
39 
(8.5) 
33 
(8.5) 
 
Some College 30 
(1.1) 
27 
(1.2) 
33 
(3.2) 
30 
(3.7) 
 46 
(1.7) 
44 
(2.0) 
45 
(4.8) 
67 
(5.3) 
 
High School 
or less 
25 
(1.1) 
27 
(1.2) 
31 
(3.6) 
23 
(3.1) 
 38 
(1.8) 
44 
(1.9) 
51 
(5.8) 
45 
(5.4) 
1990 College 16 
(1.5) 
13 
(1.4) 
19 
(5.0) 
14 
(5.6) 
     
 
Some College 31 
(1.7) 
25 
(1.7) 
28 
(3.9) 
17 
(4.0) 
     
 
High School 
or less 
19 
(1.5) 
23 
(1.6) 
23 
(4.4) 
21 
(5.1) 
     
 
         
Notes: 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  Divorce rates are measured from marital history 
reports and include all marriages that formed during the decade under consideration.  Marriages that end by 
the death of one spouse are included in the denominator.  Standard errors are in parentheses.    
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Table 2: Trends in Remarriage 
Probit Regression 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Remarried 
Full sample White 
Women 
Black 
Women 
White 
Men 
Black 
Men 
 
Regression 
Coefficients: 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
1980 Dummy -.074*** 
(.001) 
-.062*** 
(.002) 
-.054*** 
(.002) 
-.139*** 
(.005) 
-.050*** 
(.002) 
-.104*** 
(.005) 
 
1990s Dummy -.086*** 
(.004) 
-.094*** 
(.004) 
-.068*** 
(.005) 
-.220*** 
(.015) 
-.105*** 
(006) 
-.159*** 
(.021) 
 
2004 Dummy -.105*** 
(.004) 
-.135*** 
(.004) 
-.087*** 
(.006) 
-.256*** 
(.016) 
-.167*** 
(.007) 
-.261*** 
(.021) 
 
Age at marriage  -.012*** 
(.001) 
-.017*** 
(.000) 
-.010*** 
(.001) 
-.016*** 
(.001) 
-.009*** 
(.001) 
 
Age  .007*** 
(.001) 
.006*** 
(.001) 
.011*** 
(.001) 
.009*** 
(.001) 
.009*** 
(.001) 
 
Sample size 1503866 1503866 698836 96519 590483 71772  
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Census of Population 1970 and 1980.  Survey of Income and Program Participation 1991, 1992, 1993 
and 2004. Marginal effects reported. 
 
Table 3: Education and Remarriage  
Probit Regression 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Remarried 
2004 SIPP 1995 CPS 
 
1980 CPS 
 
1971 CPS 
Regression 
Coefficients: 
(1) 
 
(2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
College dummy -.078*** 
(0.015)** 
-.032** 
(.015) 
0.025 
(0.015) 
 0.005 
(.016) 
-0.039* 
(.023) 
-.095*** 
(.030) 
Yrs since divorce  .016*** 
(.001) 
.014*** 
(0.001) 
 .023*** 
(.001) 
0.016*** 
(.001) 
.013*** 
(.001) 
Length of marriage  -.015*** 
(.001) 
-.016*** 
(.001) 
 -.014*** 
(.001) 
-.008*** 
(.002) 
-.009*** 
(.001) 
Age at marriage   -.028*** 
(.002) 
 -.028*** 
(0.002) 
-.028*** 
(.002) 
-0.012*** 
(.003) 
Sample size 8319 8319 8319  8851 7303 5252 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Marginal effects reported.  The 1971 CPS survey only asked about the first and most recent marriage.  
If individuals are married three or more times, their second marriage is assumed to begin halfway between the end 
of their first marriage and the beginning of their latest marriage. 
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Table 4: Children Ever Born Among 45 to 50 Year Old Women 
 College  
Graduates 
Some College HS Graduates HS 
Dropouts 
All 
White Women      
1950 1.22 1.75 1.74 2.69 2.33 
1960 1.50  1.81 1.84 2.50 2.18 
1970 2.22  2.49 2.46 2.92 2.63 
1980 2.40  2.90 2.92 3.39 2.99 
1990 1.85  2.33 2.49 2.99 2.40 
2004 1.56  1.90 1.97 2.86 1.91 
Black Women      
1950 1.73 1.99 2.13 2.76 2.67 
1960 1.37  1.69 1.96 2.84 2.62 
1970 1.80  2.32 2.64 3.49 3.19 
1980 2.10  3.23 3.45 4.37 3.80 
1990 1.89  2.54 2.85 3.63 2.92 
2004 1.50  2.22 2.22 2.78 2.13 
Notes: Census of Population (1950-1990) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004)  
The “Children Ever Born” question was asked in 1950 and 1960 only of women who had ever married.  To provide 
numbers that are representative of all women, the above statistics are constructed from the ever married women of 
1950 and 1960, and the never married women aged 65-70 and 55-60, respectively, from the 1970 Census.  The 
number of never married 45-50 yr olds in 1950 and 1960 that had married by 1970 is negligible.   
 
 
Table 5: Trends in Expectations Regarding Marriage and Happiness: “Married 
people are generally happier than unmarried people?”   
 Women   Men   
 
Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither 
1988:       
College Graduate 47.4 11.1 41.6 62.2 5.6 32.2 
Non-College Graduate 53.7  14.7 31.6 57.8 12.5 29.7 
1994:        
College Graduate 46.6  17.8 35.6 57.8 8.0 34.2 
Non-College Graduate 45.2  19.0 35.8 48.5 22.2 29.3 
2002:        
College Graduate 50.7  19.5 29.9 47.9 18.8 33.3 
Non-College Graduate 37.4  24.9 37.8 49.2 17.5 33.3 
Notes: Data are from the General Social Survey.  In 1988, 1994, and 2002.  The Agree category includes those that 
“strongly agree” and “agree” while the Disagree category includes those that “strongly disagree” and “disagree.”  
The Neither category includes those who “can’t choose” and those who “neither agree nor disagree.” 
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Table 6: Trends in Marital Happiness 
Ordered Probit 
Regression 
  Dependent   Variable: “Taking things all together how 
would you describe your marriage?”  
[3] Very Happy [2] Pretty Happy  [1]Not Too Happy 
Regression Coefficients: (1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4) 
College*white .222 *** 
(.032) 
.132*** 
(.037) 
 .106*** 
(.032) 
.094*** 
(.035) 
College*black .004 
(.114) 
-.105 
(.117) 
 -.015 
(.121) 
-.034 
(.121) 
College*Time Trend -0.004 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.005) 
 .014*** 
(.004) 
.014*** 
(.004) 
Time Trend -.005** 
(.002) 
-.009*** 
(.003) 
 -.009*** 
(.002) 
-.010*** 
(.003) 
Black -.379*** 
(.046) 
-.329*** 
(.048) 
 -.364*** 
(.049) 
-.388*** 
(.051) 
Sample Women 
 
 Men 
Controls:         
 
     
Percent Very Happy: White Women Black Women White Men Black Men  
College      
1970’s 74 59  70 49 
2000’s 67 55  74 51 
Non-College      
1970’s 66 46  70 55 
2000’s 59 55  63 54 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sample size for women is 
11228 and for men is 10111.  Data are from the General Social Survey from 1973-2006. (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses)   
(a) Employment status includes indicators for full-time, part-time, temporary illness/vacation/strike, unemployed, 
retired, in school, keeping house, and other; Income is based on imputations of real family income, collapsed into 
indicator variables, one for each decile; Children includes indicator variables for the number of children ever born, 
up to eight; Education variables are coded the highest degree earned by the respondent, respondent’s father, and 
respondent’s mother, including separate variables for <high school, high school, associates/junior college, 
bachelor’s, or graduate degrees; Religion includes separate indicators for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, None and 
Other; Region includes indicator variables for each of 9 regions. Separate dummy variables are also included for 
missing values of each control variable. 
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Table 7: Trends in Family Satisfaction 
Ordered Probit 
Regression 
Dependent   
Variable:  
“How much satisfaction do you get from your family 
life?” [7] A very great deal  [6] A great deal [5] quite a  bit 
[4] A fair amount [3] Some [2] A little [1] None 
Regression Coefficients: (1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4) 
College*white .155*** 
(.034) 
-.064 
(.058) 
 .052* 
(.031) 
-.082 
(.061) 
College*black .150 
(.099) 
.129 
(.131) 
 .221* 
(.126) 
.227 
(.166) 
College*Time Trend -.005 
(.007) 
-.003 
(.007) 
 .003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
Black -.336*** 
(.036) 
-.207*** 
(.040) 
 -.258*** 
(.046) 
-.106** 
(.051) 
Time Trend .002 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.004) 
  -.003 
(.006) 
.000 
(.004) 
College*Married*white  .258*** 
(.070) 
  .073 
(.070) 
College*Married*black  -.250 
(.193) 
  -.277 
(.229) 
Married  .403*** 
(.030) 
  .933*** 
(.038) 
Sample Women 
 
 Men 
Controls:         
 
     
Percent Very Great Deal: White Women Black Women White Men Black Men  
College      
1970’s 53 33  44 44 
1990’s 53 24  47 39 
Non-College      
1970’s 45 32  41 32 
1990’s 46 28  40 31 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Sample size for women is 
11321and for men is 8699.  Data are from the General Social Survey from 1973-1994.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 (a)  Employment status includes indicators for full-time, part-time, temporary illness/vacation/strike, unemployed, 
retired, in school, keeping house, and other; Income is based on imputations of real family income, collapsed into 
indicator variables, one for each decile; Children includes indicator variables for the number of children ever born, 
up to eight; Education variables are coded the highest degree earned by the respondent, respondent’s father, and 
respondent’s mother, including separate variables for <high school, high school, associates/junior college, 
bachelor’s, or graduate degrees; Religion includes separate indicators for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, None and 
Other; Region includes indicator variables for each of 9 regions. Separate dummy variables are also included for 
missing values of each control variable.  
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Table 8: Educational Attainment of Women Ages 45-50 by decade 
 College  
Graduates 
Some College HS Graduates HS 
Dropouts 
White Women     
1950 6 10 20 65 
1960  7 11 27 56 
1970  7 13 41 39 
1980  11 16 44 29 
1990  20 27 36 17 
2000  30 33 28 9 
2007  30 32 30 8 
Black Women     
1950 2 2 4 92 
1960  3 4 9 84 
1970  4 6 19 71 
1980  8 13 29 51 
1990  13 23 31 33 
2000  18 33 30 20 
2007  19 33 34 14 
Notes: 1950-2000 data are from the Censuses of Population.  2007 data are from the American Community 
Survey.  Each cell represents the percent of white or black 45-50 year old women with that level of educational 
attainment. 
Figures—1 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of White and Black Women Ever Married by Age in 2007 
 
Source:  2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  The percent who have ever married at each age are shown in the left and right panels for white and black 
women, respectively.  Each panel shows ever-married rates separately for those with and without a college degree. 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of White Women Ever-Married by Age, 1950-2000 
 
Source:  1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent who have ever married at each age in a specific decade for those with high 
school or below, some college, or a college degree for white women. 
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Figure 3: Proportion of Black Women Ever-Married by Age, 1960-2007 
 
Source:  1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and the 2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent who have ever married at each age in a specific year for black women with 
high school or below, some college, or a college degree. Because of small sample sizes a three-year moving average 
centered at each age is used for 1960 and 1970. 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of White Men Ever-Married by Age, 1960-2007 
 
Source:  1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and the 2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent who have ever married at each age in a specific year for white men with high 
school or below, some college, or a college degree. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of Black Men Ever-Married by Age, 1960-2007 
 
Source:  1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and the 2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent who have ever married at each age in a specific year for black men with high 
school or below, some college, or a college degree. Because of small sample sizes a three-year moving average 
centered at each age is used in 1960 and 1970. 
 
Figure 6: First Marriages of Women Ending in Divorce, by Year of Marriage 
  
Source:  2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  Data are from marital histories in which 
respondents report the year a marriage began and, if it ended by divorce, the year the divorce occurred.   
Notes:  Each panel reports the proportion of women’s first marriages ending in divorce at each year since the 
marriage occurred for six decadal cohorts. Cohorts are formed based on the year of marriage. 
0
.
5
1
0
.
5
1
20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50
1960 1970 1980
1990 2000 2007
High School and Below Some College
College or more
Ev
e
r 
M
a
rr
ie
d
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Blacks, High School and Below Blacks, Some College Blacks, College Graduates
Whites, High School and Below Whites, Some College Whites, College Graduates
1950 1960
1970 1980
1990 2000
Pr
o
po
rti
on
 
o
f M
ar
ria
ge
 
En
di
n
g 
in
 
D
ivo
rc
e
Figures—4 
 
Figure 7: First Marriages of Men Ending in Divorce, by Year of Marriage 
  
Source:  2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  Data are from marital histories in which 
respondents report the year a marriage began and, if it ended by divorce, the year the divorce occurred 
Notes:  Each panel reports the proportion of men’s first marriages ending in divorce at each year since the 
marriage occurred for six decadal cohorts. Cohorts are formed based on the year of marriage. 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of White Women Remarried by Years since Divorce 1971-2004 
 
Source: Current Population Survey (June 1971, 1980, and 1995) and Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (2004).  Data are based on reports of marital history. 
Notes:  Each panel reports the proportion of white women who experienced a divorce who had remarried for 
each year since divorce separately by education. 
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Figure 9: Proportion of Black Women Remarried by Years since Divorce 1971-2004  
 
Source: Current Population Survey (June 1971, 1980, 1995) and Survey of Income & Program Participation (2004)  
Notes:  Each panel reports the proportion of white women who experienced a divorce who had remarried for each 
year since divorce separately by education. 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of Men Remarried by Years since Divorce 1971-2004 
 
Source: Current Population Survey (June 1971) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004) 
Notes:  Each panel reports the proportion of white or black men who experienced a divorce who had 
remarried for each year since divorce separately by education. 
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Figure 11: Average Number of Children in the Household by Age (White Women) 
 
Source:  1950, 1960, 1970, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and 2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent of white women with children in the household at each age in a specific 
decade for those with high school or below, some college, or a college degree for white women. 
 
Figure 12: Average Number of Children in the Household by Age (Black Women) 
 
Source:  1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population and 2007 American Community Survey  
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent of black women with children in the household at each age in a specific 
decade for those with high school or below, some college, or a college degree for white women. Because of small 
sample sizes a three-year moving average centered at each age is used in 1960 and 1970. 
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Figure 13: Proportion of White and Black Women Currently Married 
 
 
Source:  1960 and 1980 Censuses of Population and 2007 American Community Survey 
Notes:  Each panel shows the percent of white and black women who are currently married at each age in a specific 
decade for those with high school or below, some college, or a college degree for white women. Because of small 
sample sizes a three-year moving average centered at each age is used in 1960 for Black Women. The samples size 
for black college graduates aged 70 and older in 1960 is too small to warrant any form of inference and hence are 
excluded. 
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